ABSTRACT. This paper develops original models to study interacting agents in financial markets.
INTRODUCTION
How do markets reach consensus on prices? This is the central theme of this paper. Traders interact with one another and learn from their environment. Our aim is to propose new models of interaction and learning.
These new models of learning and interaction entail agents who observe actions of other traders and update their own beliefs. Repeated interaction can in certain cases lead to consensus on a particular value of a tradeable commodity. Interaction models should take into account the environment of trading. The more traditional or tried approach is to analyze limit order books. However, the introduction of electronic limit order books poses challenges but also offers new opportunities to develop new models.
Learning models offer a cogent and natural way to analyze interaction when agents learn and observe each others' past actions. For such models there is a rich interplay between probability, dynamical systems and game theoretic ideas [MT + 17]. Our goal here is to introduce novel ways to analyze learning in the financial markets. Researchers have developed many mathematical pricing models that use tools from stochastic calculus and partial differential equations (PDEs). The issue of price formation at a microscopic level is not really addressed nor is interaction a feature in traditional stochastic asset pricing models. The standard object is in formulating a stochastic process that represents a stock price. For example, the most basic would be geometric Brownian motion: dS t = µS t dt + σS t dW t .
Here µ and σ denote the mean rate of return and volatility for some stock and W t is a Brownian motion. These basic processes then form the backbone of advanced option pricing models that postulate a process for the asset. Let us turn the question on its head. What if we don't know the process? Traditional finance models assure us that S t is a good process to model the stock price and S t is the market consensus price or the mid price of indicative quotes. But if we dig a little bit deeper we have to ask how did the marketplace decide on the stock price S t in the first place. There must have been interactions between the players to arrive at this quote. One may propose more advanced stochastic processes but we are interested in a more basic question. How do we study interaction at the microscopic level? At a higher frequeny level, agents or machines (algorithms) are interacting before a consensus is reached.
An alternative way to ask is how do agents actually trading come to reach a consensus on a particular price? In many instance, models will postulate that a financial asset's current price be the available. What mechanism led to that price being selected. It seems natural to develop aspects of social learning as a starting point.
FOUNDATIONS
Social learning models are now actively studied in many disciplines and there are many distinct frameworks. The literature is too vast for us to cite all the major works. So we will highlight the most relevant ones. In all walks of life, individuals make decisions by observing and inferring actions of others. What thought process leads one to make a choice after seeing his or her peers select theirs is a central question not only in the social sciences but also in engineering and physics [Lor05] . The key point is observation. Human beings are visual creatures. One of the most canonical models in learning and aggregation of information is the Degroot model [DeG74] . and the dynamics are X t = AX t−1 . Iterating this, we obtain X t = A t X 0 . Provided that the matrix A is aperiodic and irreducible consensus is reached and all the agents reach the same decision lim t→∞ X = C1 for some C ∈ R. Of course, the consensus value depends on the initial value. Instructive and illustrative examples are developed in [Jac10] .
This simple example Degroot belies many important subtleties. Some social learning purists might object that there are redundacies. Agent 1 may take a weighted average of all agents but then agent 2 is also incoporating views of the other agents also which gets double counted by agent 1 in further iterations. This is a strength of the model.
The whole updating process is such that provided the matrix A is irreducible and aperiodic there is eventual consensus. The fact there is double counting is not viewing the problem correctly. As each player may weigh beliefs differently. Players' different averaging weights are seen as their own unique take on the averaging rule. By repeated averaging, agents agree on how to average the same way: the rows become equal.
We focus on Degroot learning models as these represent the reality of trading accurately. This style of learning is preferable because agents act simultaneously in a round-by-round fashion. In contrast, for sequential learning models, each agent makes a decision or update based on the information set of previous choices. Aggregation of information occurs as more agents update but at each point in time only one agent updates. Private signals can also be incorporated in this setting. However, the sequential nature of updating seems unnatural. For a good survey of social learning in both sequential and simulataneuous settings one may refer to [GS, MT + 17, AO11]. Average-based dynamics leads to efficient outcomes provided no individual exerts a large influence [GJ10] . Averaging agents are also known as Naive learners because they use the same rule repeatedly. More generally, these type of dynamics fall under the growing literature on nonBayesian social learning .
2.1. Bayesian Observational Learning. Theoretical social learning models are roughly divided into two paradigms: Bayesian and non-Bayesian. Bayesian observational learning examples include [Ban92, BHW92] and [SS00] . They fall under the category of herd behaviour. These models are sequential in nature. Agents have a common prior P(θ) for some state of the world θ ∈ Θ at t = 0, where Θ is the set of possible states. As time passes, a player in turn observes the actions of previous agents and receives a private signal. Each agent has a one-off decision when she updates her posterior probability and takes an action (usually a binary choice). In some instances a correct decision is reached on the true state of the world by the nth agent as n → ∞. After some point, everyone may take the same action. So do agents asymptotically learn the truth?
Even in the simplest of settings, characterizing equilibria is intractable [CEMS08] and computationally difficult [HJMR18] . Agents are assumed to be perfect Bayesian machines, who can do complex posterior calculations by observing past actions and possess a common prior. These assumptions may seem a bit unrealistic or too strong. There could be signals that leads society astray. Information flows in one direction, where an infinite number of agents are exogenously ordered on a line. If the first few signals are wrong, there could be a cascade and no asymptotic learning takes place. Nevertheless, Bayesian models serve as a useful benchmark. Aysmptotic Bayesian social learning is examined at length in [MST14] , where the one-off action is relaxed to allow for repeated plays.
Many modelling environments assume there is a ground truth that agents want to learn. It could be that there is no ground truth. Recently there has been some work to try an axiomatic semi-Bayesian approach [MTSJ18] . A more general framework for rational learning is offered in [MF13] from a theoretical economics standpoint.
2.2. Financial markets: non-Bayesian. In financial markets, trading is never sequential. Transactions occurs at breakneck speed. Agents move simultaneuously: cancellations are the norm in today's fast markets. In practical terms, sequential learning models don't seem appropriate. Interaction is important in the emergence of consensus. Choices by agents from the previous round of play are available to all agents in the current round of play. The question is then what sort of averaging or heurestic process is ideal.
Degroot learning models convey an essential idea. They offer a functional form of updating. Myopic updating occurs in each round. Something akin to persuasion bias could explain our basic model [DVZ03] . As in an echo chamber, agents in our setup have fixed weights but update their responses until consensus is reached. One could think of it as a behavioural heuristic and why repeated averaging is effective. Alternatively, with the right cost function representating the distance of an agent's opinion against other opinions the best response is repeated averaging. Recently there have been some experimental papers on evidence of Degroot updating [CLX15, BBC17] . Repeated averaging models are our base precisely because they capture the nature of interaction and learning in financial markets so succinctly. On top of the base models we develop more sophisticated extensions, relaxing the fixed nature of the weights and learning matrices.
2.3. Multiagent learning. Degroot updating is also studied as distributed consensus in the engineering community [Bau16] . A group of sensors or drones communicate to reach consensus. Here existing methods use graph theory. Moreover, the techniques we introduce to solve the consensus problems are quite distinct from the usual ones utilized in engineering literature. Distributed consensus has an updating rule in the simplest of cases as x t = A(t)x t−1 , with x t ∈ R n and A a row stochastic matrix. Agents can be seen as vertices in a graph (G) with edges, which is represented as G(V, E). Usually, the graphs have a fixed set of vertices so V = {1, 2, · · · , n} and the edges (j, k) denote if agent j puts weight on k's opinion. In our setting, this corresponds to the number of agents being fixed while the edges or links can be random or time varying. One can interpret the framework we investigate as a distributed consensus problem. Generally, in engineering problems, the emphasis is on design of algorithms that can control the decentralized process to reach consensus. Distribution algorithms on agreement have been extensively studied in engineering. Some related works are [MS07, BHOT05, OSFM07, Mor05].
2.4. Game theory. Our emphasis is on trading but any network where the players have access to some sort of learning feedback is suitable. A game theoretic framework where every player takes into account other players' payoff is unrealistic and points to serious difficulties on how to even represent utilities; these are economic arguments that are better addressed by philosophical interludes. Moreover, traders rarely have access to private information on how previous decisions led to a certain payoff for their opponent at least not in a high frequency sense. If a trading firm is a publicly listed company, then one can infer its trading losses or gains from public records. Nevertheless specific profit and loss accounts of trading individual stocks is a private matter. Firms never break down their income statements down to specific asset classes or instruments. Results are almagamated and reported quarterly: not per hour, minute or second.
Therefore, pure game theory has its shortcomings. Similar questions and issues to this paper were raised in [Kir02] at an informal level. Our interest is in building a suitable mathematical structure on which to ask those interesting questions of price formation. Players can observe previous choices but not the payoffs of their competitors. A more in depth discussion of learning in games would take us further away from our goal of studying the mathematical nature of interaction. The reader can consult [FDLL98, KL94] for a game theoretic perspective. Dynamical learning is an active area of research in computer science as well. Articles [PP18, PNGCS14, MPV17] propose and analyze the dynamics separate from the concept of Nash equilibrium.
BASIC MODELS
Economists also have many models of learning [Sob00] . Depending on the question, different paradigms have been put forth. Our objective is learning and so we aim to use aspects of both game theory and dynamical systems. Difficulties in Bayesian environments mean the Degroot model has become a workhorse for social learning [BBCM19] . It offers a way forward for tractable models that can relax simple assumptions. Research using this framework is still active. In our setting, a group of traders observe quotes of others and incorporate an average of previous round quotes. The departure from standard Degroot learning comes comes from the fact that not only are the agents learning but they are getting feedback from an external source on the true consensus value. To our knowledge, the setting of these types of consensus models to trading is new. We use the framework of [VMP18] as the base case for our models. Consider
which in the matrix form reads
where X t = (x 1 t , ..., x n t ) T is the opinion of each agent in discrete time t, and E = diag( 1 , ..., n ) is the learning rate of each agent when they are provided with a feedback on the consensusσ. The opinion matrix A encapsulates the weights agents put on each other. We require n j=1 a ij = 1. Agents' ability to determine the quality of feedback is their ability . For our purposes, we are careful to distinguish between two concepts: learning and trading time. We will focus on learning time. Typically in active financial markets, the quotes (bids and offers) that agents post are canceled or revised many times before actual trades occur. Although trading is occuring at a high frequency, the revision of quotes is occuring at an even higher frequency. See [GPW + 13] for a discussion on cancellations. Agents or market participants are all trying to learn the true value of a traded instrument. Agents can see all the previous quotes and thus take a weighted view of what the next quote should be. The learning activity occurs beforē σ is actually evolving due to trading. For us, time t is learning time and is quite distinct from trading time, which we we will assume to be constant. We weaken the condition of convergence as stated in [VMP18] .
The feedback can best explain the situation where a similar instrument is traded on another exchange or there is a common source of market chatter. Moreover, such chatter is commonly provided through voice box brokers or over-the-counter markets. We assume all agents have access to this feedback or chatter. One example would the S&P500 European ETF (SPY) options, which are not cash settled as SPX options but stock settled. Quotes for the SPY options will also be linked with the SPX options. Another example of contracts that contain information on vols is a VIX (volatility index) futures contract. Sometimes trades occur off-exchange and get reported at the end of the day through the exchange's clearing system. How agents interpret information or market chatter is their unique learning ability.
ORGAINIZATION OF RESULTS
We investigate variations of the model 3.1, characterizing different features. In section 6, the result from [VMP18] is relaxed to see under what conditions consensus is still possible. A key feature is that provided agents have positive learning rates i then consensus is the equilibrium value. In this case, while the particular value is unknown at the start, learning and interaction ensure convergence to equilibrium.
While the first type of deterministic dynamics are useful, they ignore the reality of noise. Randomness is an additional term in the feedback term in section 7. We introduce a random variable γ t as a source of noise. The main theorem shows that if γ t → 0 almost surely or in probability, then X t →σ. However, the argument is not straightforward.
Theorem 6 explains the mechanics behind these concepts. Furthermore, provided the weights matrix A and learning rates E satisfy some weak conditions, X t reaches consensus. If the noise is not going to zero, then the system converges in distribution. Numerical simulations confirm that X t does reach an asymptotic distribution that may not even be Gaussian.
Nonlinear learning 8 is an extension of our Degroot learners. Players still average from their observations of past actions but their own unique learning ability and how they interpret the extra information is a nonlinear function. This type of model fits with the earlier linear models, preserving the averaging nature of interaction. Suitable conditions on the nonlinear function are derived that exhibit consensus. If the shocks are permanent, then convergence to distribution is possible as with the linear case.
Section 9 presents the strongest convergence in distribution result. The true state is arrived at endogenously and the consensus value is an endogenous feature. While the earlier sections assumed that the equilibrium value orσ is present in the system, this section assumes no such universal truth. Though the agents in earlier dynamics come to learnσ they do not know it outright. In the averaging case, we propose thatσ is not part of the system. Whatever value agents asymptotically converge to, provided they all agree, is the consensus value. This presents challenges to prove convergence to a probability measure. The main result in this section is the central limit theorem 9.13. Lindberg's original argument is helfpul in proving the CLT.
In all the models we potray, if the agents are already synchronized or at consensus, then the system stays there. While this may seem a moot point, it is worth mentioning. In traditional game-theoretic models the focus is on equilibrium. The focus here is how do the agents reach equilibrium.
NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
In all subsequent analysis A refers to a row-stochastic weights matrix, whose rows sum to one. Depending on the setup, A can be time varying or fixed.
We use the infinity norm, namely we take for a vector v =
For any m × n matrix B, we denote
We then have for any m × n matrix B and any n dimensional vector v
BASE MODEL
In the base model, we have n agents and a fixed row-stochastic matrix A, which is the weights matrix. The dynamics for updating is (6.1)
We can impose a weaker condition on i and useσ =σ1 n for notational convenience when the dimension is clear. Proof. Equation 6.1 now becomes
Setting B = (A − E) and Y t = X t+1 −σ, the updating rule simplifies to
where we have used the stochasticity of A, that is sum of the elements of each row is 1. From this if we check that |a ii − i | + 1 − a ii < 1 which is the same as |a ii − i | < a ii or equivalently
we definitely obtain 0 ≤ ρ < 1 and |Y t | ∞ ≤ ρ |Y t−1 | ∞ . This is enough to conclude that
From which letting t → ∞ shows that
and in particular also proves that
Remarks. This argument allows an extension to the case when the matrices A t and E t depend on t. The bottom line here is that we want
For example, this is the case if all ρ t are bounded by ρ < 1. However, condition 6.2 also allows cases where ρ t −→ t→∞ 1. We highlight two examples. For the first we have convergence.
t+1 which converges to 0 as t → ∞.
However, condition 6.2 also ensures we don't have the following situation.
k 2 ) which does not converge to zero.
Condition 6.2 can also be written as
In fact, this is the case if − log ρt t −α ≥ C for some C > 0 and α > 0. This translates to
We can extend the conclusions if we replace the ∞-norm of a vector by something of the form
where β is a vector of positive values such that Aβ ≤ δβ. In this new norm we now have
From the assumption Aβ ≤ δβ we can get in the first place that Interestingly, if A is not necessarily stochastic but has positive entries, then by a theorem of Perron-Frobenius there exists a real eigenvalue that is greater than the absolute value of all the other eigenvalues and its eigenvector has positive entries. The argument above shows that we can definitely choose δ and β to have the same result.
The above arguments allow us to posit this result.
In the case A t are all equal to A, then if 0
LEARNING WITH RANDOM NOISE
Our base model with learning can be extended to have random noise in the feedback term. We introduce a random vector γ t which we quantify later. The hypothesis is that γ t is small. For this section we also consider the case of time depending evolution.
The model is given by
where X t is the vector of prices at time t andσ is the vector of equilibrium price or consensus value the agents are trying to learn. In order to prove that X t −σ converges to 0, we rewrite the equation as
Therefore if we denote by Y t = X t−1 −σ, then we ca simplify the above expression as
With the same argument as before we obtain
We formulate a general result as follows.
Theorem 6. Assume the model X t = A t X t−1 + E t (σ + γ t − X t−1 ). With the notation from (7.1) assume that
(4) If we assume
where now (γ t ) t≥1 are iid and integrable and in addition to (7.2) we assume that
Then,
(5) Furthermore, if γ t is integrable but not constant almost surely, then, without condition (7.4), the conclusion of (7.5) does not hold.
Observe here the fact that in the last part of the Theorem we incorporated the constantσ into γ t . The convergence is in distribution sense and thus it does not lead to convergence as in the previous cases. Even if we assume that γ t is of the formσ + γ t , the convergence will not be toσ alone. Thus this is a different convergence scenario and in spirit is not of the same form as the other cases.
Proof.
(1) From our base model in terms of Y t is (7.6)
From this we get
If we assume that
Indeed, this becomes a purely deterministic statement. For a given > 0, we can find that |γ t | ∞ ≤ for all t ≥ t . Then,
Using the previous inequalities for t − 1, t − 2, . . . , t gives that
From (7.2) we obtain in the first place that for some constant A > 0,
We recall here the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, which states that for any real numbers a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t and b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b t , we have
and in particular this implies that for any a i > 0,
Now we can write using (7.9) that
where we used the fact that from (7.8), we have that ρ 1 ρ 2 . . . ρ s ≤ A for any s ≥ 1. Notice here that we need to distinguish here two cases, namely ρ t ρ t−1 . . . ρ 1 > 0 and ρ t ρ t−1 . . . ρ 1 = 0. The above inequality works for the former case, but in both cases we obtain that (7.10) ρ t ρ t−1 . . . ρ 1 ≤ A 2 t which yields that ρ t ρ t−1 . . . ρ 1 converges to 0. Thus in this case we get
(2) If we only assume a weaker condition, namely that γ t P − −− → t→∞ 0 (only convergence in probability), then iterating (7.7) we obtain (7.11)
with the convention that t i=t+1 ρ i = 1. To finish the proof of we use the following Lemma with u t = |γ t | ∞ .
Lemma 7. Let (u n ) n≥1 be a random sequence such that
Then, under the assumption (7.2), we have the convergence
Proof. For the argument denote for simplicity of writing η t,i = ρ t ρ t−i . . . ρ t−i+1 . The first observation here is that condition (7.21) gives that for any t ≥ s, using (7.9), we proceed as in the proof of (7.10) to argue that
s 2 As .
Notice that we used the fact that (from (7.8)) for any s ≤ t, ρ t ρ t−1 . . . ρ s ≤ A. Therefore (7.14) ρ t ρ t−1 . . . ρ t−s+1 ≤ A 2 s and using this and again (7.8) for t replaced by t − s we obtain that (7.15)
Now, we fix s ≤ t and write
Now, for a given and | t i=1 η t,i u t−i | > , we must have that at least one of the above sums must be at least /2, thus, we can write for each fixed > 0,
The next step is to use the boundedness of u t . Take arbitrary δ, M > 0, (here δ is meant to be small and M to be large) and then set
From the condition (7.13) we definitely have that P(A M ) converges to 1 as M tends to infinity. Therefore we can continue the equation (7.16) with
where in the passage from the first line to the second we used the union bound, more precisely, if we have s i=1 η t,i |u t−i | ≥ /2 then at least one of the terms must be ≥ /(2s) plus the union bound on the probability. Finally in passage to the last line we simply used (7.15).
Next we can freeze for now , s, M and use the fact that for each i, η t,i u t−i converges to 0 in probability since η t,i is bounded by A > 0 and use (7.15) to argue that the limit as t → ∞ we gain that
For large s, obviously P( A+1 s > /(2M )) = 0 and thus we arrive at
From this, we take the limit as M → ∞ and using (7.12)
which means convergence of t i=1 η i u t−i to 0 in probability. Now let's return to the proof of the Theorem. (3) For the L p convergence we just need to take expectation of (7.11). (4) For the convergence in distribution we start by writing X t = B t X t−1 + E t γ t where B t = A t − E t . The idea is that because γ t are in L 1 so are all the variables X t . We are going to use the Wasserstein distance to control the difference between the distributions of X t and X t−1 .
The basic idea is that in a slightly modified Wasserstein distance D we have a contraction in the sense that there exists some ρ < 1 such that
For the sake of completeness we define here for two n-dimensional random variables, X, Y or better for their distributions µ X , µ Y ,
where α is a 2n-dimensional distribution with marginals µ X and µ Y andXỸ are two random variables on the same probability space (we call it a coupling) with the same distributions as X, respectively Y . The second equality follows easily from takingX andỸ to be the projections from π i : R n × R n → R n , given by π 1 (x, y) = x while π 2 (x, y) = y. To go from the pair (X,Ỹ ) back to the measure α, we just need to take α to be the distribution of the pair (X,Ỹ ).
The standard Wasserstein distance is defined as
Because any two norms on R n are equivalent, we can find two constants c 1 , c 2 > 0 such that
It is known that W 1 gives the topology of weak converge on the space of probability measures with finite first moment (that is |x|µ(dx) < ∞). Due to the above inequality we also infer the completeness with respect to the metric D on the same space P 1 (R n ).
To carry on this program we define for a distribution µ, the following map
where X is a random variable with distribution µ and γ is a random variable independent of X and having the same distribution as the sequence γ t . Now we want to look at D(X t , X t−1 ) and estimate it from above. To do this assume that we have a coupling between X t−1 and X t−2 and then we can create an optimal coupling between X t and X t−1 (with respect to the distance D, which certainly exists from Kantorovich general result) and then take γ independent of both X t−1 and X t−2 and use
Taking | · | ∞ and the expectation both sides we get the estimate
where we denoted by
Notice that in the time independent case, the terms α t is 0, which implies that X t converges in distribution.
In the general case we need to use the extra conditions from (7.4). From the above considerations we actually show first that the expectation of X t obeys the equation (keep in mind that sup t≥1 |E t | ∞ ≤ A + 1)
Using this and the standard iterations combined with (7.2) we get that
On the other hand from (7.19) we get that
Using this and a simple iteration it leads to
In particular, summing this over t from t to t + s, leads to
According to (7.15) we conclude that the sum s i=1 ρ t+i−1 . . . ρ 2 converges to 0 as s, t → ∞. We will show that the other sum also converges to 0 as both t, s → ∞. To this end notice that from (7.4), we can set
and write α t = β t − β t+1 . After rearrangements, this leads to
The first term converges to 0 beecause of (7.14) and the rest, converges to 0 because of the above Lemma thanks to the fact that β t converges to 0, this converges to 0.
This proves the convergence in distribution. (5) Next we show that the condition (7.4) is also a necessary condition. Indeed, if we take the one dimensional case with
such that
In fact we will choose
w i /i and we will choose w i = ±1 in the following fashion. First we take all w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w τ 1 such that τ 1 ≤ 3/4 but 3/4 < τ 1 + c/(τ 1 + 1). Notice that we can do this because the harmonic series is divergent. Now, we choose τ 2 > τ 1 such that w τ 1 +1 = w τ 1 +2 = · · · = w τ 2 = −1 and τ 2 − 1/(10(τ 2 + 1)) < 1/4 ≤ τ 2 . Now we choose τ 3 > τ 2 and w t 2 +1 = · · · = w t 3 = 1 such that τ 3 ≤ 3/4 < τ 3 + c/(τ 3 + 1). Then we choose τ 4 > τ 3 such that w τ 3 +1 = w τ 3 +2 = · · · = w τ 4 = −1 such that τ 4 − 1/(10(τ 4 + 1)) < 1/4 ≤ τ 4 . And we continue inductively. Thus we have defined a sequence t such that 1/4 ≤ t ≤ 3/4 such that { t } t≥1 = [1/4, 3/4].
In other words the limit points of the sequence t is just the interval [1/4, 3/4] and obviously the condition (7.2) is fulfilled.
With this choice of the sequence t , we claim that the sequence X t does not converge in distribution. Indeed the argument is based on the simple observation that if it were, then taking the characteristic functions φ Xt we would get
As a recall, φ X (ξ) = E[e iξX ] for any ξ ∈ R. In particular this means that if X t converges to some random variable Y , then taking a subsequence t n for which tn −−−→ n→∞ x we obtain that (7.21)
Under the assumption that γ is integrable we claim that γ must be constant and also X is going to be the same constant. To carry this out we argue that for x = 1/4 and x = 3/4 we get that
Replacing ξ by 4ξ/3 we arrive at
Replacing here ξ by ξ/3, ξ/3 2 , . . . , ξ/3 n and multiplying these we get that
Now letting n → ∞ and using the fact that for any random variable Z, φ Z (ξ/3 n ) −−−→ n→∞ 1 we obtain that
in other words, Y has the same distribution as γ. Using this in (7.21) with x = 1/2 we arrive at
Iterating this we get
which can be written alternatively as
where Y 1 , Y 2 , . . . are iid with the same distribution as Y . Since Y and γ have the same distributions and γ is integrable, it follows that Y is also integrable. This in particular implies from the law of large numbers that
. Since convergence almost surely implies convergence in distribution, we get that
in other words, Y must be constant. This implies that γ is also constant which then finishes the argument. FIGURE 2. When the noise is Gaussian, then X t converges to a Normal distribution. This is the picture on the left. The joint plot illustrates the case for two agents who learn from each other with A and E fixed. Variable x1 and x2 represent agents 1 and 2. The right hand side picture represents the convergence results for γ t taking only values ±1 with equal probability and independently of one another in each component.
Remark 8.
We need to point out that integrability is key for the conclusion of the last part of Theorem 6. If we drop the integrability condition, then the passage from (7.22) to (7.23) is not possible. In fact, if we take (γ t ) t≥1 to be all iid Cauchy(1) and X 0 = 0, then X t will also follow a Cauchy(1) random variable for any choice of 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 with 1 > 0. Certainly in this case we do not need any other assumptions on or ρ t to get convergence. We leave as an open problem the optimal conditions under which the model (7.3) converges as t → ∞.
7.1. Simulations for convergence to distribution. Let us illustrate Theorem 6 and result 7.5. Suppose that the noise γ t is a Normal random variable. Numerical simulations show that X t converges to a Gaussian random variable for each component -figure 2. The the asymptotic distribution is Gaussian centered around the true valueσ. The main point is that we do not need to scale X t .
Suppose, the iid (γ t )s are vectors of just +1 or −1, then X t converges in distribution. In figure 2, the simulated distribution looks distinctly non-Gaussian. For other noises non-standard distributions can occur.
NONLINEAR LEARNING
While Degroot updating is retained in this section, we develop nonlinear models of learning. Instead of E, there is a non-linear function.
Definition 9. The learning function is f t : R n → R n is continuous on some compact convex subset K ⊆ R n and differentiable on its interior, with f (0) = 0. Component wise it is
Notice that the update or feedback is now varying with time. Learning or feed back stops when σ − X t = 0, so the condition f t (0) = 0 ensures this. The updating rule for agent i becomes
Moreover, the weights matrix A is also time varying. Previous sections showed convergence results of linear updating f t,i = i , a fixed scalar. Actual updating of feedback can be be quite complex, and having a nonlinear feedback or learning rule allows us to expand the linear model.
Theorem 10.
For ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n} and ∀t ≥ 0, suppose the learning function satisfies
and if we denote
we assume that
(1) With the dynamics
consensus is reached and lim t→∞ X t =σ. (2) If the evolution is given by
under the same assumption as in (8.1), then γ t − −− → verges to zero a.s, in probability or in L 1 , then X t converges accordingly).
(3) Again assume (8.2) and
where the sequence (γ t ) t≥1 is assumed to be iid and integrable. If in addition we have that
Notice that the last part of the result above does not involve theσ because it is actually hidden in the sequence γ. As opposed to the other two cases, the convergence is only in distribution and in principle that is implicitly defined, it is not a constant variable as in the previous cases.
Proof.
(1) First we subtractσ from both sides of the dynamics equation. As A is stochastic, A(t)σ =σ, hence
Second, we recast the equation using the infinity-norm
For individual i, the updating rule becomes
The second equality follows because the learning function is continuous and differentiable hence
for some ξ i ∈ (0, x) by the Mean value theorem. By assumption
but this is equivalent there being some 0 < δ i < 1 such that ∀ξ ∈ R (8.5)
The above condition gives us two cases to consider. In the first case, ignoring dependence on t, for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n} and ξ
In the second case,
Thus we obtain that
thus we have a contraction in |X t −σ| ∞ and consequently,
(2) The deviation equation from consensus is
Essentially the same steps follow as the in the proof with no noise
The rest of the proof follows as in the proof of Theorem 6, more precisely, following the same argument starting with (7.7). In all instances the convergence follows the same arguments as in the linear case. (3) First observe that from (8.3) we get
From this, iterating and using (8.2) as in the linear case we obtain that
To treat the case where γ t are all iid, we follow the same argument as the linear case. Here we have to use in the first place the distance defined in (7.18) and the argument for the estimate of D(X t , X t−1 ) we need to take a for any couplingX t−1 andX t−2 the coupling
From this we proceed exactly in the same way as in the proof of the linear case, more precisely, the same proof following (7.20) to show that X t is Cauchy in the metric D.
Remark 11. Matrix A(t) and learning function f t are allowed to be time dependent or slowly varying. They could be random but in a controlled way. Were A and f to be fixed in time, the above result would still hold. So the constant case is a special case of what we have shown.
Continuity of the learning function f t is essential. We give an example of a situation where it breaks down.
Example 12. Consider the sign function
If the learning f were the signum function, then the dynamics would be
Consensus in this case would not be achieved. One can plainly see this in the one dimensional case of A t = 1, σ = 1, Y t = X t − σ, Y 0 = 1 and take 1/3 < E < 1/2. With this setup we get
which shows that Y t becomes periodic, thus not convergent. We can extend this behavior to more general situations of course, though this periodic pattern still follows.
AVERAGE DYNAMICS
The previous model with learning assumesσ is already known. In the case where the true σ is not a priori assumed to exist, one of the possibilities is to replace σ by some average of all the players and the model becomes
where X t−1 is the average of the sigmas of all the players. On a pure information level, this seems more satisfactory. There is no outside knowledge, all information is entirely contained within the interactions. For a large number of players, this makes perfect sense. However, in this case the main issue is to show that the model converges. To do this we interpret U for any vector U as
The system becomes now
We want to show that X t converges to a vector which is a multiple of
9.1. Fixed A and E. In this section we give an algebraic approach of the case of A and E constant in time.
Theorem 13. If A is an n × n stochastic matrix and E is such that 0 < i < n n − 1 a ii for any i and
Convergence is also exponentially fast.
Proof. Note that ∆X t−1 = X t−1 . Since
it means that
For the time homogenous case, we require B = A + E∆ − E to be a stochastic matrix. It suffices to enforce the condition
In this case, B is a stochastic matrix and we are requiring b ii > 0 or positive self belief. The system now becomes X t = BX t−1 .
To show that X t converges, we can put B in Jordan form B = J −1 DJ, where D is a block Jordan matrix. If we let Y t = JX t , we obtain the equivalent system
From the Perron-Frobenius theorem (notice here that indeed B has positive entries since i > 0) we know that 1 is a single eigenvalue and all other eigenvalues are in absolute value less than 1. Thus
Where J i corresponds to Jordan block
In fact, from the above representation, (Y t ) 1 = (Y t−1 ) 1 , which means that the first entry of Y t does not change. The rest of the analysis reduces to systems of the form
with |λ| < 1. For such a situation we use the concrete expression of
Now as |λ| < 1, we can show that with
(this is the matrix with 1's in the super-diagonal) that we have
On the other hand, it is not difficult to see that U n = 0, thus in the above sum we have to collect only the terms k < n, in other words
because |λ| < 1. The conclusion is that for 0 < i < n n−1 a ii we have that X t converges to a vector v. From the equation X t = BX t−1 we get that v = Bv, which from Perron-Frobenius shows that
Time varying A(t) and E(t).
Time varying here allows for some randomness in that the entries can change over time but not drastically enough to alter the structure of the matrix. In the later sections, we will consider matrices which are allowed to be truly random with less restrictions on entries. In the previous section A and E were constant. We now look at the behaviour of time varying stochastic matrices and learning rates. We have the general model still given by (9.1), which reduces to
or, if we set (9.4)
the above system becomes X t = B(t)X t−1 . We will just refer to this system as X t = B t X t−1 for notation purposes. For the general case of time varying matrices, we need a different idea since the Jordan form of B t produces a matrix J t which depends on t. The argument used above fails because for each t a different corresponding J t exists.
Another way is to look at how much the components of X t differ from each other. A quantifier for this is the oscillation we introduce now. Definition 14. Define for a vector X,
and for an n × n matrix A, the Dobrushin coefficient by
We provide here a Lemma which is classical but we provide also the proof for reader's convenience.
Lemma 15. If A is a matrix whose row sums are all equal and X = AY , then
In particular, if A is a stochastic matrix, then
Proof. We can write
Thus, because the sums on rows does not change, we actually have
Taking the absolute values and using the fact that |Z k | ≤ osc(Y )/2, gives the result.
Before we state the next result, we define
Theorem 16. Assume we have the model with deterministic stochastic matrices A t , γ t random variables and
(1) Let B t = A t + E t (∆ − I) and assume that ρ t = δ(B t ) > 0 for each t ≥ 1 and 
If γ t = 0 for all t ≥ 1, then, for some λ > 0 (9.10) X t a.s.
(2) Assume now that we have
(3) Assume that (9.11) holds true and that (9.12)
and that (γ t ) t≥1 is a sequence of iid random variables with mean µ ∈ R n and covariance matrix Σ. Then,
in distribution sense.
Remark 17.
(1) Notice here that because of our assumption (9.6) we get that
and in particular we get another proof of the time independent model as well. (2) For any matrix B with sums of rows equal to 1, which is the case of B = A t + E t (∆ − I), using the fact that a ∧ b = a+b−|a−b| 2
, we have another expression for
For instance, if we define
and if B is a stochastic matrix with all positive entries, then
This is our situation generated by the condition (9.6). (3) The convergence in probability of the series t≥1 |γ t | ∞ is the same as the almost surely convergence, and this is the reason why this is left out.
(4) As opposed to the case of Theorem 6, this time, to guarantee consensus in the long run for X t , we need the hypothesis of convergence of t≥1 |γ t | ∞ . Just convergence of γ t to 0 is not enough in this case. For instance, if γ t = (1/t)e, and X 1 = 0, with A t and E i = E 1 for all i independent of time t, then X t = c( t i=1 1/i)e which is clearly not convergent. (5) Contrary to the case of Theorem 6, if we take γ t to be iid, we do not get converge in distribution of X t itself. For instance if we assume that X 0 = 0 and A t and E t are constant such that the diagonal of E is also constant, then for γ t = u t e, we get that X t = c( t i=1 u t )e. This is not convergent unless u t = 0 a.s.. However this is complemented by the last part of the Theorem which show that properly scaled, this convergences to a multidimensional normal random variable. (6) Notice that the covariance matrix of the normal limit (9.13), is actually rank one because the matrix C is rank one. Thus the normal random variable is actually supported on a line.
Proof. We will show in fact first (9.13) and then (9.9) follows by taking initial vectors to be the coordinate vectors of R n . We prove the general situation and we take with the notation B t = A t + E t (∆ − I),
from which we get in the first place that (9.14)
and with the same argument from Theorem 6, under (9.7) we obtain that osc(X t ) converges to 0 under the convergence of t≥1 |γ t | ∞ (in both a.s. case and also in L p sense). On the other hand, since B t is a stochastic matrix, we have also that (9.15)
(1) From this, if we take γ t = 0, then (9.15) together with (9.14) gives that X t converges to a multiple of the vector 1. Thus, taking for X 0 one of the basis vectors of R n , and using the fact that
we obtain that the matrix t s=1 B s converges to a matrix C which has repeated rows. (2) We need here the following rewriting of (9.15) (9.16)
(a) If t≥1 |γ t | ∞ < ∞ almost surely, then using (9.16) and get that (X t ) min − t s=1 (γ t ) min is convergent (monotone and bounded). In a similar way we also have that (X t ) max − t s=1 (γ t ) max is convergent. Therefore, because the oscillation goes to zero we get that X t is almost surely convergent. Combined with the fact that osc(X t ) converges to 0, this implies the convergence of X t in almost sure sense.
(b) If t≥1 |γ t | ∞ converges in some L p , then it is also a.s. convergent. Consequently, we have that t≥1 |γ t | ∞ < ∞ thus we can invoke the previous part to argue that X t converges a.s. to a random variable X.
To show the L p convergence, we first notice that X t is in L p for every p (just from the recurrence relation). Next, using (9.14), we have that osc(X t ) converges to 0 in L p . On the other hand, for any s < t, we have
Using this, the convergence of B t to C and some standard estimates we get that for some constant K > 0,
This shows that the sequence (X t ) t≥0 is Cauchy in in L p . In particular this means the sequence is convergent in L p and because it also converges almost surely it must converge to the same limit. (3) To show convergence in distribution we proceed as follows. We first observe that in the case γ t are normally distributed, the random variable X t is actually normally distributed with mean
and covariance matrix given by
Because t k=1 B k converges to C and E t converges to E, this means that
On the other hand, if γ t are not normal, we can take copies of Z t which are normal and we can put all the variables γ t and Z t on the same probability space. We will compare the sums X t with Y t , which we define by
with Y 0 = X 0 . We certainly have in the first place that
where in order to simply the notation we set
B s .
From this we can reduce the rest of the proof to the case of X 0 = 0 and E[γ t ] = 0. These do not change the covariance matrices of X t and Y t which remain the same.
Next we will use the Lindberg argument which involves the comparison of X t and Y t . For a reference of this look at [Str00] . In the first place realize that
Take now a smooth function φ : R n → R with all bounded derivatives, and we will compare
with the definition
Thus, W k is independent of γ k and Z k . Now for a smooth function we can use Taylor's formula with integral remainder, φ(x + y) = φ(x) + Dφ(x)(y) + Going now back to the decomposition (9.17), using the independence of W s from both γ s and also Z s and the fact that γ s and Z s have the same mean and covariance, we can write When the noise is not decaying, condition 7.4 is crucial to ensure convergence in distribution. This condition can be thought of as a stabilization feature of learning. Individuals learn with varying A t and E t but these cannot change too drastically. Eventually, all agents settle down. We extended the standard Degroot learning models to incorporate a variety of noise terms.
One criticism of havingσ is that it is already incorporated into the learning. To relax this assumption, we introduced averaging dynamics where the ground truth is endogenous [Son16] to the social network. The central limit theorem developed in Theorem 16 has an unusual feature. The marginal distributions are Gaussian but the joint distribution encapsulates the consensus property as agents synchronize along a line. An interesting aspect of our results is that we place no restrictions on the interaction matrix A, the implicit network topology, being full connected all the time. Social connections can change with time. The only requirement was that agents have self-belief. However, there can be periods of insanity where learning rates i 's are also zero or the interaction matrix is just the identity matrix. Individual players can be insane and refuse fo learn for short bouts. Mixing of beliefs and convergence to consensus is ensured by conditions 9.7 or 7.2. These assumptions are weaker than previous attempts, which require strong connectivity between the agents.
Thus far, agents' rules are mechanical. Future work should address the issue of rationality. In Degroot learning, individuals are boundedly rational. They use the same rule. What if the agents are strategic? In the presence of noise or disturbance, manipulation of opinion dynamics by forceful agents [AOP10] becomes an interesting but difficult question. A possible way forward is to look at fully nonlinear models. Random dynamical systems were reviewed by [BM03] . Our results use different techniqes to study social learning. Though it must be acknowledged that recursive random dynamical systems are not new in economics, their probabilistic analysis poses several challenges to researchers. The interaction between mathematical finance and game theory groups should take into account the resurgence in social learning models. How a distribution of beliefs on prices for financial assets arises is not only a fundamental question for game theorists but also of interest to proponents of stochastic volatility and asset pricing models. Rather than viewing trading as an exogenous activity, it should be seen as an essential combination of interaction and learning.
